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BORDERS AND INTEGRATION: BECOMING A 
BOSNIAN-AMERICAN 
ADNA KARAMEHIC-OATES, PH.D.* 
AJLINA KARAMEHIC-MURATOVIC, PH.D. ** 
ABSTRACT 
For Bosnian and Herzegovinians fleeing the conflict in their homeland 
in the 1990s, the process of finding a safe haven was a tumultuous 
experience. Despite the protections outlined in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, the response of former Yugoslavia’s neighboring countries to 
the humanitarian crisis was a tightening of borders and restrictive 
reception policies. These experiences are in contrast to the reception 
policies Bosnian refugees encountered in the United States, whose 
permanent resettlement program at that period in time offered 
opportunities for ‘normal life,’ as discussed by Jansen1. 
‘Border work,’ using Jones and Johnson’s2 term, has implications for 
practical forms of integration. This paper reviews and contrasts the 
‘border work’ of European nations and the United States in relation to 
Bosnian refugees and discusses the integration of Bosnian-Americans in 
the United States, using St. Louis, Missouri, as an example. With the focus 
on the Bosnian community in the United States, particularly in cities with 
many Bosnians, studying the US Bosnian diaspora makes for an 
interesting case study provided that in terms of social, cultural, and 
economic adaptation, the Bosnian story is considered an immigrant 
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The paper has implications for practical forms of integration, 
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As a result of the conflict in the early 1990s, over half of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s (hereafter simply ‘Bosnia’) 4.3 million people were driven 
from their homes. Of this number, over a million were internally 
displaced, while the rest left the country as refugees for various countries 
around the world. According to estimates by Bosnian authorities, at least 2 
million people originating from Bosnia currently live outside the country, 
which is the highest number recorded by the Ministry since it began 
publishing an annual report on migration flows in the late 2000s.3 Given 
that the migration outflows from Bosnia prior to the conflict were minor 
compared to the exodus triggered by the conflict, the vast majority of the 
Bosnian global diaspora is therefore constituted by forced or involuntary 
migrants.  
For this fleeing population, the process of finding a safe haven was a 
tumultuous experience. Despite the protections outlined in the 1951 
Geneva Convention, they encountered a tightening of borders and 
restrictive reception policies among former Yugoslavia’s neighboring 
nations, where many refugees initially sought refuge. This ‘border work,’ 
using Jones and Johnson’s4 term, can be contrasted with the reception 
policies Bosnian refugees encountered in the United States, which offered 
them a permanent solution to displacement through resettlement. The 
possibility for ‘normal life’ through the ‘border work’ of the US 
government at that juncture in time has been manifested in the 
development and flourishing of Bosnian communities and a Bosnian-
American way of life in the places identified by the US State Department 
for resettlement, such as St. Louis, Missouri. 
This paper reflects on the immigration policies of European nations and 
the United States towards Bosnian refugees in the 1990s, comparing the 
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conditions for integration provided by the policy framework in each case. 
It argues that the permanent solution offered by the United States offered 
more thorough conditions for integration and as such established the 
foundations for starting over and living normally in a new place and 
environment. This was critical given the cataclysmic events refugees had 
experienced in their homeland. In other words, while the conflict upended 
all notions of comfort and safety in Bosnia, US policies at that time gave 
Bosnian refugees the chance to rebuild their lives and communities. They 
have done so in various American cities and towns and thus represent an 
interesting case study in terms of successful social, cultural, and economic 
immigrant adaptation.  
II. ETHNIC CLEANSING AND GENOCIDE 
Over almost four years beginning in late 1991, Serb nationalists carried 
out a campaign of violent ethnic cleansing and genocide. Their leader 
Radovan Karadžić did not parse words in the methods they intended to use 
in order to transform Bosnia from a historically multiethnic homeland into 
an ethnically homogeneous territory: “They do not understand that there 
will be rivers of blood […] and that the Muslim people would disappear.”5 
As representatives from Helsinki Watch, a division of the organization 
Human Rights Watch, found when they traveled to Bosnia in the spring of 
1992 in order to investigate violations of human rights, a process of 
extermination is exactly what Serb paramilitary units had begun:  
The full-scale war that has been raging in Bosnia-Hercegovina since 
early April has been marked by extreme violations of international 
humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war. Indeed, violations 
of the rules of war are being committed with increasing frequency 
and brutality throughout the country. The extent of the violence 
inflicted on the civilian population by all parties is appalling. 
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Mistreatment in detention, the taking of hostages and the pillaging 
of civilian property is widespread throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
The most basic safeguards intended to protect civilians and medical 
establishments have been flagrantly ignored. The indiscriminate use 
of force by Serbian troops has caused excessive collateral damage 
and loss of civilian life. A policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ has resulted 
in the summary execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, 
deportation and forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands of 
people on the basis of their religion or nationality. In sum, the 
extent of the violence raises the question of whether genocide is 
taking place.6  
The horrific nature of what was happening being clear to them, the authors 
did not hold anything back in their recommendation to the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council to exercise its authority under the 1951 Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and intervene 
in Bosnia. 4 
As is now well-known, the international community’s response to what 
was occurring in Bosnia and to appeals such as the above was to remain 
noncommittal. In Gow’s view, “bad timing, bad judgment, an absence of 
unity and, underpinning everything else, the lack of political will” were a 
combination that constituted “the essential characteristics of diplomatic 
dereliction.”7 For Bosnia’s defenders, the implications of that dereliction 
were catastrophic, as European governments (and later US President 
Clinton, reversing his previous stance) refused to lift the 1991 UN arms 
embargo against Bosnian Muslims and Croats.8 This essentially tipped the 
weaponry balance in favor of the Vojska Republike Srpske (Army of the 
Republika Srpska), or VRS, for the duration of the conflict, as they had 
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inherited weapons stockpiles from the Yugoslav National Army. The 
policy facilitated a relentless assault on the country and its citizens by 
preventing the Bosnians from effectively fighting back.   
 An important factor that made the Bosnian and other Yugoslav 
conflicts so riveting to scholars of ethnicity and nationalism was how 
ethnicized and violent they became, given that, as Gagnon writes, 
“indicators on the ground, within specific communities, showed no sign of 
inevitable violence.”9 He and other scholars have pushed back on the 
explanation of the conflict as the product of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ which 
was promulgated widely among Western journalists, academics and 
policymakers, instead studying the process of ethnicization more critically 
in order to explain what occurred and why. For Gagnon, violence along 
ethnic lines was a policy pursued by certain Yugoslav elites in order to 
destroy existing social realities:  
To motivate someone, it is necessary to tap into relationships, into 
relational senses of identity and self, or into environmental factors 
that do so. The violence of ethnic conflicts is thus not meant to 
mobilize people by appealing to ethnicity – that is, it does not tap 
into these relational processes. Rather, its goal is to fundamentally 
alter or destroy these social realities. Indeed, given the rootedness of 
such realities in peoples’ everyday lives, the only way to destroy 
them and to impose homogeneity onto existing, heterogeneous 
social spaces is through massive violence.10  
What this policy meant for Bosnians living in towns and villages 
throughout the country – particularly in mixed communities - is that, as if 
overnight, neighbors ceased to be neighbors and became perpetrators of 
war crimes. Anthropologist Tone Bringa illustrated the development of 
mistrust and fear among individuals previously peacefully sharing space 
and place in a conflict imposed from outside in the documentary “We Are 
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All Neighbours”.11 This transformation of communities occurred across 
Bosnia: the  safety and security of homes were transgressed as VRS militia 
and police forcibly entered and arrested ‘suspects’ or committed other 
heinous crimes while family members had no choice but to stand aside.12 
Buildings and cultural symbols associated with a particular ethnic group 
were severely shelled and damaged, and homes themselves were set 
ablaze, many burned down to just the foundations.13  
This context is what hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, but 
also Bosnian Croats, left behind as they fled from an anticipated attack, or 
were simply expelled and forced to hand over keys and sign over 
ownership of their property. Their homes are now by and large in the 
Bosnian territorial entity the Republika Srpska, translated to “Serb 
Republic,” which is comprised of territories that were violently attacked 
and cleansed of non-Serb residents. The formalization of the Republika 
Srpska at the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 was thus a de facto 
acceptance of the results of the ethnic cleansing project that had been 
carried out over the previous three and a half years. It is also the place 
European policymakers envisioned repatriating the refugees that had 
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III. BOSNIAN REFUGEES AND TEMPORARY PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN 
EUROPE 
The first wave of migration triggered by the VRS’ ethnic cleansing 
campaign occurred in 1992, the first year of the war. A second wave 
occurred in 1993-1994; and the last following the attack on Srebrenica in 
July 1995.14 The outflows continued even after the end of the war however, 
due to harsh economic, political and social conditions.  
In the early years of the war, neighboring countries such as Croatia, 
Slovenia and Serbia and EU countries such as Germany, Austria and 
Sweden were the destination for most of Bosnia’s refugees.15 These 
countries kept their borders open to refugees for a longer time than other 
European countries, and had existing communities of Bosnians, Croats and 
Serbs that would attract refugees as well as help them in the migration.16  
Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of refugees displaced by the 
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15  Marko Valenta & Sabrina Ramet, Bosnian Diaspora: Studies on Bosnian Immigrants and 
Transnational Communities (2011) 
16  Valenta & Strabac, supra at 14.  













Figure 1. Refugee migrations from the former Yugoslavia. Source: 
Valenta, Marko and Zan Strabac. (2013). The dynamics of Bosnian 
refugee migrations in the 1990s, current migration trends and future 
prospects. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 32 (3), 1-22. 
However, the specter of refugee inflows from the former Yugoslavia 
incited many western European countries to begin shifting policy away 
from resettlement and political asylum and more towards temporary 
protection and repatriation as solutions to refugee inflows.17 Jones and 
Johnson categorize such stricter immigration policies as part of a broader 
approach by countries that they call ‘border work.’ ‘Border work’ occurs 
at a range of scales and places and  
is directed not only at transgressions of borders in the narrow sense 
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of preventing a human from violating territorial sovereignty by 
crossing a line at the margins of a state’s sovereignty, but also at 
border crossing by particular undesirable categories of goods and 
services, specific types of information, certain classes of humans, 
and nature.18 
Jones and Johnson argue that despite the predictions of postmodernist 
literature, borders have become a larger, not smaller part of everyday life 
for most people. For the millions of other refugees seeking a new home, 
‘border work’ means that they are the ‘undesirable categories,’ the 
‘outside’ from which ‘the inside’ is being protected.19 From the perspective 
of the countries facing an influx of refugees from Bosnia, the ‘outsiders’ 
would bring pressure on the social system, negatively affecting the 
‘inside.’20  
When refugees from the former Yugoslavia thus began arriving at the 
borders of western European countries, host governments chose a form of 
‘border work’ that while physically granting access across the border 
would still contain a clear marker of delineation between the ‘insider’ and 
the ‘outsider.’ Specifically, they selected to avoid granting durable 
protection or asylum to those fleeing and instead provide temporary safe 
haven. The idea behind this policy was that when safe haven was deemed 
to no longer be necessary, the displaced would need to return to their 
homeland. Temporary protection was not a new concept, having been 
codified in a 1969 African refugee convention as well as discussed as a 
policy option for those fleeing both southeast Asia and central American 
civil wars in the 70s and 80s.21 But in the early 1990s, UNHCR affirmed 
and recommended the use of temporary protection to its member states as 
a strategy to increase the overall safety of people at risk, given that 
western European governments, alongside promoting temporary protection 
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for refugees, were at the same time increasing barriers to entry for those 
from the former Yugoslavia and tightening asylum procedures.22  
Austria was one of the first countries in western Europe to feel the 
effects of the Bosnian refugee outflow in early 1992. In reaction, in 1993 
the Austrian Ministry of Interior developed and enacted a Residence Law 
according to which Bosnian refugees could be granted temporary 
residence; however, despite the drastic conditions of their displacement, 
they still needed to show valid travel documents and adequate financial 
means to enter Austria. By 1995, these restrictions expanded into the 
requirement of a visa to enter Austria. Though Bosnian refugees did have 
the right to apply for full refugee status in Austria – meaning to be 
recognized as such under the 1951 UN Geneva Convention – statistics 
show that most Bosnian refugees’ applications were rejected. Franz notes: 
The Federal Asylum Office rejected the vast majority of the asylum 
claims of Bosnian refugees, holding that the applicants had failed to 
establish a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion in the sense of Article 1 of the 1951 Convention. 
The Federal Asylum Office also rejected claims of applicants who 
had been raped by paramilitary forces.23  
Though some of the details differed, most western European countries 
adopted a version of the policy of temporary protection for Bosnian 
refugees.  Indeed, as Fitzpatrick argues, not only were many European 
countries not overwhelmed by refugee inflows from the former 
Yugoslavia as was argued in rationalizing temporary protection (Austria 
and Germany perhaps being the only exceptions), the application of 
temporary protection appeared to be a way to circumvent recognition 
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under the 1951 Geneva Convention, threatening the Convention itself.24 
Kibreab refers to this harmonization and coordination of refugee policies 
across territories as ‘Fortress Europe,’ which calls into question the 
validity of increasing claims in post-modernist literature that globalization 
has led to a deterritorialization of identity as a consequence of which we 
are all becoming citizens of a deterritorialized global world. Instead, “the 
globalization process has been accompanied by restrictive immigration 
and refugee policies,” as countries not only tighten their borders but also 
adopt restrictive reception policies that discourage integration into the new 
society.25    
Displaced Bosnians and their families were faced with these restrictive 
measures upon fleeing to western European countries. There was no 
consistent set of rights for those under temporary protection, but the rights 
that did exist were certainly fewer and more limited than what was 
available to refugees recognized as such under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention.26 For example, according to a report by the Humanitarian 
Issues Working Group27 examining countries’ responses to the 
humanitarian crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the comparison of standards 
accorded to recognized refugees and those under temporary protection in 
Austria is described as follows: “Unlike persons formally granted asylum, 
beneficiaries of temporary protection do not, in principle, have the right to 
integration assistance, e.g. language and vocational training, 
accommodation allowances and other financial support, refugee travel 
documents and work without work permits”. Austria removed some of 
these restrictions on displaced Bosnians in the later phase of its temporary 
protection system, but in other countries the policy remained quite strict. 
On this same question of comparison of standards accorded to recognized 
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12 J. Refugee Stud. no. 4, 1999 at 390.  
26  U.N.H.C.R., A ‘Timeless’ Treaty Under Attack, (June 1, 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
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refugees and asylum seekers in Germany, the report is quite blunt: “None 
of the categories of persons enjoying a form of temporary protection has 
the same rights as recognized refugees in Germany.”28   
Specifically, those under temporary protection in Germany were denied 
access to the labor market and education.29  In Switzerland, one category of 
people under the temporary protection system were not given access to 
social care, the labor market or education.30 Through these restrictions, 
these host countries’ policies pushed Bosnian refugees to seek other 
options for improving their personal situations. Many joined the informal 
labor market for example; according to Franz, Viennese authorities’ 
figures suggest that about 40 percent of Bosnian refugees, mostly women, 
were working in the informal sector in 1994.31  
A. Temporary Protection as Repatriation 
Given that the finite nature of the temporary protection policy was one 
of its key presumptions, when the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in 
late 1995, most western European host countries launched repatriation 
programs to have refugees return to Bosnia. Underpinning host countries’ 
shared objective to repatriate were two factors, according to scholars. 
First, offering resettlement or a permanent status to the displaced would 
have appeared as an acceptance of the ethnic cleansing and genocide 
project in Bosnia. Resisting or reversing the results of ethnic cleansing and 
genocide was clearly a goal of the architects of the Dayton Agreement and 
specifically its Annex 7, which outlined the right of refugees and displaced 
persons to return to their pre-war homes. As Toal and Dahlman write: 
while ending the war was the priority, a more ambitious 
demographic restoration was imagined because it was politically 
and morally affirming […] the GFA [General Framework 
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Agreement] created the possibility that the human displacement 
consequences of ethnic cleansing could be reversed.32  
Second, repatriation was also in line with what Malkki calls the 
sedentarist bias that exists in much of the field of refugee studies and 
among policymakers. According to this bias, “to become uprooted and 
removed from a national community is automatically to lose one’s 
identity, traditions and culture.”33 Displacement upsets what is a normal 
state of being, expelling the refugee from the place he belongs. This 
inherent bias about the natural and inseparable link between people and 
place inevitably spills over into the realm of policymaking, privileging for 
example the concept of state sovereignty in refugee matters, whether that 
refers to controlling borders or managing the refugee as a ‘problem’ 
through internal policies.34  
Western European host countries exercised varying degrees of coercion 
in the returns policy of Bosnian refugees and offered varying levels of 
assistance to promote return.35 At the same time, most also gradually 
changed the status of individuals that did not return and allowed them to 
remain permanently.36 In addition to Switzerland, Turkey, Croatia and 
Slovenia which were on the more activist end of repatriating refugees to 
Bosnia, Germany was notable in that it was the only country that didn’t 
gradually transform its temporary protection system into one of more 
permanent protection.37 Germany had one of the largest populations of 
Bosnian refugees, estimated to be up to 400,000 at its peak. This was 
partly a consequence of the government’s initial generous welfare 
offerings to refugees as well as a ban on deportations. However, as the 
high cost of maintaining the refugee system became more evident and as 
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the war ended in Bosnia, the German government lifted the ban on 
deportations and began to repatriate Bosnian refugees in phases, with 
childless couples as well as refugees with criminal records being sent back 
first.38  
Many Bosnian refugees tried to convince host countries that the 
preconditions for a sustainable return were not in place. In 
Germany, many also struggled to convince the authorities that they 
were entitled to humanitarian protection. […] More than 20,000 
Bosnian refugees succeeded in convincing German authorities that 
they were entitled to refugee status or humanitarian protection and 
settled permanently in the host country. Nevertheless, since the war 
ended, German authorities returned hundreds of thousands of 
Bosnians by force or by using a combination of coercion and 
extensive pay-to-go schemes.39  
Select countries’ active efforts to repatriate Bosnian refugees have been 
criticized as not only premature and a case of mistaken priority40, but also 
“inhumane” in the case of Germany which was conducting involuntary 
repatriations even though the benchmarks which the UNHCR had set out 
to be fulfilled before repatriation was to commence were far from fulfilled.  
Germany was the only EU country that, contrary to UNHCR guidelines, 
was already in 1997 repatriating people to areas in Bosnia where they 
would be considered an ethnic minority.41 In other words, Bosnian refugees 
in Germany were being sent back to live in communities alongside a 
majority population whose extreme nationalist leadership had violently 
forced their removal. Studies of the mental health of those repatriated 
involuntarily, and where they were returned to their home country and not 
necessarily to where they used to live, show increases in depression and 
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symptoms of PTSD.42  
For those facing the scenario of involuntary repatriation, a sense of 
liminality was reinforced by creating a feeling of insecurity about one’s 
rights and legal status.43 Dimova44 argues that the fear and uncertainty 
created trauma directly linked to duldung or the temporary protection 
status; it was a trauma on top of pre-existing traumas from the war, 
because the strict policy meant that  
the safest way of obtaining a residence permit […] proved to be by 
demonstrating severe traumatization. Hence, these people have been 
torn between required (and often exaggerated) remembering of their 
past war experiences, and the contemporary, real, but unrecognized 
trauma of feared detainment and deportation. This more 
contemporary trauma has become a dominant structuring force of 
their current lives.45  
IV. A DURABLE SOLUTION TO DISPLACEMENT—RESETTLEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Once the plans to repatriate Bosnian refugees were announced by 
western European countries, the refugees had to begin thinking about a 
durable solution to their displacement. Their options were limited: they 
could return to Bosnia, to the area they were from with the specific post-
war circumstances it entailed, or elsewhere in the country. Or, they could 
seek to be resettled in a third country. This latter option held the greatest 
promise, as it offered predictability and stability. At this time, the United 
 
 
42  Ulrike Con Lersner, THOMAS ELBERT & FRANK NEUNER, MENTAL HEALTH OF REFUGEES 
FOLLOWING STATE-SPONSORED REPATRIATION FROM GERMANY, 8 BMC Psychiatry 88, 88 (2008). 
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44  Rozita Dimova, From Strategic Remembrance to Politics of Tolerance: Memories of the 
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States, Australia and Canada were accepting such applications from those 
displaced by the conflict in Bosnia.  
A. A Brief Overview of the US Refugee System 
The US refugee program has three main components: the asylum 
system, the resettlement program, and overseas assistance.46 Though the 
resettlement program is the most visible and active component, it is 
important to note the difference between it and the asylum system. 
Asylum applications are based on a mechanism historically available 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, specifically Section 
208.47  To receive this status, an applicant must already be in the United 
States under different status and must provide evidence of persecution 
based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group and/or 
political opinion. There is a process of adjudication before an asylum 
officer or an immigration judge. Recipients of this status have the right to 
work, to apply for permanent residency, and to petition for a spouse or 
unmarried children to join them in the United States.  
The resettlement program is based on the Refugee Act of 1980 and 
grants refugee status to applicants outside the United States who meet the 
definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention. To begin the application 
process, one must first register with the UNHCR in the country to which 
they have fled from their home country. UNHCR determines whether an 
applicant qualifies as a refugee, and then works towards “the best possible 
durable solution for each refugee: safe return to the home country, local 
integration, or third-country resettlement.”48  
If UNHCR determines that the best possible durable solution for an 
applicant is resettlement and refers them to the United States, one of the 
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several Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs) located around the world 
takes over the case. The RSCs are funded and managed by the State 
Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration but are 
generally operated by international non-governmental organizations. It is 
possible to skip the referral from the UNHCR and begin working directly 
with the RSC if an applicant is a close relative of an asylee or refugee 
already in the United States. The RSC collects biographic and other 
information from the applicant to prepare for an adjudication interview 
and security screening. The application is then reviewed by the 
Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), which conducts an in-person interview with each 
applicant to verify the information provided and collect any further 
information. At this stage, USCIS may approve or reject an application for 
resettlement.49 If the application is approved, the applicant attends a health 
screening to identify medical needs and rule out contagious diseases. 
Assuming no issues arise during the health screening, the resettlement 
process transitions from one of obtaining permission to enter the United 
States into one of integrating into American society. 
B. Bosnians in the US Refugee System 
Of the approximately two million Bosnians who claim Bosnia as their 
country of birth and origin but who live outside of its borders, the 2010 US 
Census data indicates that the United States became a destination for 
approximately 125,793 of this total.  It is likely, however, that the number 
of Bosnians who eventually and over time resettled and found a home in 
the United States is higher - approximately 300,000 to 350,000. This can 
be explained by the fact that only individuals reporting Bosnia as their 
country of birth are included in the US Census number, and their 
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American-born children are not counted as having the same place of 
origin, though many youths born and raised in the United States may 
identify as Bosnian. Additionally, many Bosnians who arrived in the 
United States prior to the early 1990s and during the wave of migration 
following World War Two indicated Yugoslavia as their place of birth, 
and those who resettled in the late 1990s and early 2000s are consumed by 
this number.  
The multiethnic background of Bosnians resettling in the United States 
further complicates the exact count. In the early 1900s, some of the first 
immigrants from Bosnia who were Bosnian Croats were listed as 
Yugoslavs, and prior to Bosnia’s independence, the number of immigrants 
from Bosnia was not available separately from Yugoslavia.50 After several 
successful efforts by select, particularly European countries, to repatriate 
Bosnian refugees including in the aforementioned involuntary process, the 
majority of those who resettled and found a new and permanent homeland 
in the United States were Bosniaks, and a smaller number of Bosnian 
Croats and Bosnian Serbs. Estimates indicate that in the late 1990s, 
refugees from Bosnia represented the third-largest group of refugees 
entering the United States51, and were resettled into mostly urban 
communities. Later, and well into the 2000s, many Bosnians joined their 
families already settled in the United States via the family reunification 
aspect of the resettlement program.  
Importantly, the statistics indicate that most Bosnians arrived in the late 
1990s, after the Dayton Peace Agreement had been signed and western 
European countries’ repatriation schemes had begun. For example, the US 
Census estimates that 37,000 refugees from Bosnia and asylum seekers 
obtained legal permanent resident status between 1992 and 2000; and 
between 1996 and 1999 alone, 30,000 refugees from Bosnia were recorded 
to have migrated from Germany to the United States.52 The numbers 
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continued to increase; 81,000 Bosnian refugees and asylum seekers 
obtained legal permanent resident status between 2001 and 2008.53 The 
Census further estimates a gradual decrease in the number of Bosnian-
born individuals from 2010 (125,793 in total) to 2016 (101,638 in 2016)54. 
These statistical trends and gradual decrease suggest that the majority of 
Bosnians in the United States entered in the late 1990s as refugees, a large 
number of whom were repatriated from other select nations.  
It is important to note that Foreign Intervention Agencies - 
representatives of foreign countries and non-governmental organizations 
in Bosnia - put significant political and financial investments into ensuring 
the safe return of minority populations given the obstructive practices of 
nationalist authorities. Nevertheless, minority returnee numbers were 
lower than desired; and clearly based on the above numbers, many 
refugees chose to resettle in a third country rather than return to Bosnia. A 
key framing that Jansen55 uses to explain this phenomenon in the post-war 
period is the simple but powerful term ‘normal life.’ He explains that 
‘normal life’ goes beyond the concern of safety - it also encompasses 
socio-economic security, infrastructure, healthcare and education. Without 
these constitutive aspects, one feels like their life is in limbo. The sense of 
limbo was extreme within post-war Bosnia itself, where the combination 
of structures imposed by the Dayton Peace Agreement, contradictory 
rhetoric by nationalist leaders and Foreign Intervention Agencies, among 
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V. AN IMMIGRANT SUCCESS STORY: BOSNIAN-AMERICANS 
In a study of Kurdish refugees in Finland and England, Wahlbeck57 
identified differences between the two countries in terms of resettlement 
policies and social structures, arguing that these policies had a major 
impact on how refugees were integrated into the host society. In fact, he 
found these policies to be more important in influencing integration of 
refugees than the refugees’ level of attachment and transnational 
connection to their homeland, a reason that is commonly used to explain 
poor integration. As Wahlbeck58 argues, “the integration into the wider 
society seems to be largely dependent on the exclusionary and 
inclusionary policies of the country of settlement and not on the degree of 
diasporic feelings amongst the refugees.”59  
In the United States, the context of reception for Bosnian refugees was 
very positive. This context includes the array of conditions that influence 
how well a migrant is able to integrate into society. Examples of these 
conditions are whether the migrant arrives to an existing ethnic support 
network; his employment prospects in the new society; and the level of 
tolerance in the locality of settlement. An important component of refugee 
resettlement programs in the United States for newly incoming refugees is 
language acquisition and self-sufficiency.60 English language classes were 
provided to Bosnian refugees as part of their resettlement process in the 
United States61, in contrast to European countries, whose temporary 
protection framework for arriving Bosnian refugees did not include 
language classes.62 Literature indicates that the host country language 
competence is not only important for integration, but is associated with 
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better psychological health among newly resettled refugees.63 Most 
Bosnians who initially resettled were able to learn enough of the English 
language to acquire and hold jobs, thus, ensuring a level of self-sufficiency 
required for normal life. As Franz writes, Bosnians in the United States 
and New York (in her particular study), “rarely found themselves 
dependent on public welfare systems”64 because they quickly found jobs 
and did not “experience a comparable economic downturn that prohibited 
their insertion into the labour market (even at a lower level) as was, for 
example, the case in Finland”.65 Encouraging refugees to enter the job 
market as soon as possible inevitably sped up the integration experience of 
Bosnians within the United States.  
As a result, most first generation Bosnians who call the United States 
their new homeland are US citizens and have largely integrated. At the 
same time, they are slowly decreasing in number due to mortality.  In 
contrast, their children who are American-born and mostly identify as 
“Bosnian-American” or “American-Bosnian”66 and are counted as 
American-born by the US Census, are increasing in number. Resettlement 
areas for Bosnians initially coming to the United States included mostly 
large U.S. metropolitan areas, such as St. Louis, Missouri, where many 
continue to live today, including in suburbs.67 Ethnic enclaves and 
dedicated community areas in various US urban centers that are uniquely 
Bosnian are frequent, such as the example of “Little Bosnia” in St. Louis. 
They serve an important role and purpose in the lives of many Bosnians, 
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acting as hubs for collective socialization, exchange of information, 
friendship, and mutual connection. These ethnic enclaves include those 
born in Bosnia who do not exclusively identify with and/or belong to 
Bosnian diaspora, but who may identify with Serbian and Croatian 
diaspora. “Recently arrived Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs will have 
been absorbed by ethnic enclaves that were formed by their predecessors 
in earlier times; Bosnian Muslims had to create their own communities 
from the outset”.68 Among other things, the established ethnic enclaves 
serve to support the newly found Bosnian-American identity among 
Bosnians in the United States. 
As a group, Bosnian refugees in the United States have successfully 
integrated and assimilated into mainstream US culture—economically, 
socially, and culturally. In many urban areas with a high concentration of 
Bosnian refugees, such as Chicago and St. Louis, Bosnians have been 
described and used as a model of successful refugee integration.  The 
influx of Bosnians into many of the nation’s urban areas has stabilized 
neighborhoods, led to new businesses, contributed to local culture, and 
enhanced the U.S. image as a destination for migration.69  
A select example of an established ethnic enclave individuals who 
immigrated from Bosnia and resettled in the United States is St. Louis, 
Missouri.  The first refugees from Bosnia came to St. Louis via US 
resettlement agencies who saw the city losing its population, economic 
base, and cultural character. Reportedly, the largest Bosnian community 
outside of Bosnia calls the Greater St. Louis area in Missouri their home.70 
Since the initial arrivals in mid-1990s, the Bosnian refugee community has 
consistently and significantly grown due to secondary and tertiary 
migration, now making up the largest immigrant group in the region. To 
put in context, Bosnians represent approximately one in six St. Louisans; 
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among non-English languages spoken in the area, Bosnian ranks second 
only to Spanish. Moreover, Bosnians have consistently been credited with 
revitalizing older and declining neighborhoods of the city, such an area 
now called “Little Bosnia,” populated by ethnic businesses. The Bosnian 
story is widely considered as a story of “a successful refugee integration,” 
as is the case in many other communities and urban centers in the United 
States that have a large number of Bosnians. The Bosnian diaspora in St. 
Louis has achieved “remarkable success in business, media, education, and 
the arts”, [but] “despite their numerous accomplishments, Bosnians have 
not forgotten the circumstances that brought them here,” and “while 
tragedy and sorrow created the Bosnian community here, new beginnings 
and opportunities are building a brighter future for the Bosnians and for all 
those who now call them neighbours and friends”.71 Today, the majority of 
Bosnians in the United States are citizens and whether first- or second-
generation Bosnian, tend to call themselves Bosnian-American and/or 
American-Bosnian.72  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The large-scale displacement of Bosnians, as a consequence of the 
conflict in the 1990s, created a new worldwide Bosnian diaspora. Bosnian 
refugees have resettled in many countries of the world, where they are, 
twenty years since the conflict ended, trying to rebuild their lives. The 
conflict and displacement that they experienced, as well as living in a state 
of limbo and uncertainty under temporary protected status in the initial 
countries of shelter, have shaped their personal calculations about the next 
stage of their lives. They were forced to reconsider their life needs, 
concerns and priorities, and face new questions, chief among them being 
how they can sustain themselves and their family, how they go about 
reconstituting family and life, and how they build projects for the future, 
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for themselves and their children.  
For Bosnian refugees, resettlement in the United States, with the 
stability that it offered through various components of the program, 
generated an answer to these critical questions. The US resettlement 
program not only offered permanent immigrant status, but also social 
services such as language acquisition and employment assistance that 
allowed integration to accelerate quickly. Franz warns that concluding that 
Bosnian refugees in New York, and therefore other similar US urban 
centers such as St. Louis for instance, “enjoyed a wider range of 
acclimatization support, economic opportunities and residence rights, and 
therefore “integrated more successfully into the American host society 
than a comparative group of Bosnians in Austria,” is “too simplistic.73  
Instead, she suggests that “the overarching objective of the American 
resettlement programme” ensured “speedy progress into economic self-
sufficiency, with financial and social support often given reluctantly and 
withdrawn quickly”.74  The merits of this approach - when contrasted with 
the shortfalls in European nations’ policies for support and status to 
Bosnian refugees (no integration assistance such as language, housing or 
employment support) - are demonstrated in the large numbers of Bosnian 
refugees who resettled in the United States, in particular from repatriating 
secondary countries in Europe. The merits of the US resettlement 
approach at the time are also demonstrated in the successful integration of 
Bosnian refugees into their new towns and communities, a primary 
example being the large, mostly refugee Bosnian diaspora community in 
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